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Abstract
Industrial districts are made up of numerous firms or industries interacting in
myriad ways. We create and study a model of trade and service interactions
in an industrial district, and then extend it to investigate the effect of both
positive (mutualistic) and negative (competitive) non-trade interactions on
the behaviour of two different types of industrial district - Marshallian and
hub-and-spoke. In particular we study whether the structure of the district,
or the positioning of the relationships, make a difference to the outcome for
the district as a whole.
We find that both these aspects make a difference. For instance, in both
Marshallian and hub-and-spoke districts a competitive relationship between
firms that are directly linked by trade has a stronger effect than competition
between firms that are not. On the other hand in a Marshallian district it
is possible to make the district more ‘egalitarian’ by adding a mutualistic
relationship between suppliers or between intermediary firms, but this effect
is not seen in hub-and-spoke districts. We highlight for further investigation
a hypothesis suggested by our results that the effects of mutualism on an
industrial district are more pronounced than those of competition.
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1. Introduction
Industrial districts are geographic or economic areas containing numer-
ous interacting firms or industries. For example the Humber region in the
UK is a large, active and diverse industrial area on the Humber estuary. The
area is centred on the combined ports of Grimsby and Immingham, which
together form the UK’s largest bulk port by tonnage and part of one of the
largest and busiest port complexes in Europe, see [1] and references therein.
The region is a net energy exporter, with a large number of fossil-fuel based
power stations. The diversity of industries situated in the region include
food processing industries, oil refining, chemical and bio-chemical produc-
tion facilities, as well as heavy industrial facilities such as steel making and
cement production. Many of these industries interact with one another, of-
ten via the material supply of goods or services. This can range from the
unexceptional use of electricity by almost all industries (in most instances
procured from energy suppliers via the grid), to industry-specific needs such
as biomass for co-firing power plants. These interactions form a complicated
web representing the industrial economy of the Humber region.
Obviously such an intricate network of relationships is not unique to the
Humber region. In fact, any economy which has a regional component could
be represented by a complicated set of interconnections between constituent
industries and several fields of study explicity consider industrial districts
in this way. Within economic geography, different types of industrial dis-
tricts have been classified by their distinct network structures (Markusen’s
work, to which we will return [2], gives a detailed overview and extends
the classification scheme). The different district types identified may have
more or less complex structures. For instance, “hub-and-spoke” districts are
based around one major firm. Such economies are likely to have a relatively
simple set of relationships between the industries present; either supplying
the major firm or buying and using its products. The district types are
considered to have distinctly different whole-system characteristics in terms
of stability against risk etc. as a result of both their varying structures and
the properties of the individual firms involved.
In the field of industrial ecology the networks formed by the complex
interactions and interdependencies between firms in a given locale or within
an industrial sector are regarded as “industrial ecosystems” (e.g. [3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]). An industrial ecosystem constitutes not only a
metabolic network formed by flows of energy and materials, but also formal
and informal social networks with economic, contractual and social relation-
ships through which information or money may be considered to flow (e.g.
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[13, 14, 15, 16]). The structure, nature and development of each of these
different networks are interconnected and influence that of the others. Thus
it is considered that if we wish to understand the dynamics of an industrial
ecosystem, we must understand the interplay of these different networks and
their individual structures. Ultimately, macroscopic properties of the indus-
trial ecosystem that we are interested in managing, such as carbon dioxide
emissions, material throughput, regional Gross Value Added (GVA), or job
creation will be the result of these structures and their lower-level dynamics
under the influence of regulation and other external factors.
Like industrial ecosystems, biological ecosystems consist of numerous
interconnected types of actor, or species, which influence each other posi-
tively or negatively via a number of different kinds of interaction [17, 18, 19].
Much work has been done within ecology to study the dynamics of ecolog-
ical networks and the way that the structure of those networks and distri-
bution of interaction types can affect the outcome for the whole community
(e.g. [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]). As industrial networks or ecosystems un-
doubtedly share some of the structural properties of biological ecosystems it
seems likely that some of the tools of ecological modelling could be usefully
adapted to industrial ecology.
Additionally, we are particularly motivated to compare some of the most
recent thinking about how ecosystem structure and interaction types affect
higher-level outcomes for whole ecological networks to industrial ecosystems.
This is pertinent as industrial ecology not only considers industrial networks
as structures that are in some way similar to biological ecosystems, but also
considers ecological networks as models to be emulated. Ecological termi-
nology and concepts are commonly used in this field both to describe extant
interactions within industrial systems and as potentially beneficial proper-
ties to be engineered or designed in to improve their material sustainability.
Attempts are made to promote higher level properties, such as resilience,
robustness and high resource cycling levels, claimed to be important for sus-
tainability and often ascribed to ecosystems, via the engineering of interfirm
interactions. In particular, the practice and promotion of so-called “indus-
trial symbiosis” is widespread. Industrial symbiosis is generally defined as
the reuse or recycling of one or more companies’ by-products or waste/excess
utilities or services as primary resources within the industrial network to the
benefit of both parties [26, 27, 28]. Within ecology we would more properly
refer to this as a mutualism, as symbiosis (or living together) refers to a close
and long-standing biological association of any type between two or more
species [29]. Such interactions may be mutualistic (both partners benefit),
commensualistic (one partner benefits whilst the other experiences no signif-
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icant effect) or parasitic (one partner benefits to the detriment of the other).
Despite this slight mismatch in use of terminology, a rigorous investigation
of the effects of distribution of mutualisms and other types of bipartite in-
teraction within an industrial ecosytem in conjunction with the different
possible industrial network structures could be timely and useful in testing
assumptions on how lower-level changes affect system-level properties.
In the early days of industrial ecology results were imported directly
from community ecology as heuristics to guide action. Many more modern
approaches have moved away from ecology per se however. The dynamics
of industrial ecosystems have been extensively modelled with agent-based
models (ABMs) ([30, 31, 32, 33]), as ABMs combined with material flux
analyses or life cycle analysis [34, 35, 36], or combined in multi-level mod-
els within dynamic optimization frameworks [37, 38]. The structure of in-
dustrial ecosystems has also been analysed with tools from network analy-
sis [39, 40, 41, 42], although evolution here has simply constituted study of
snapshots of structure over time rather than the simulation of interaction
dynamics on a network. Others have discussed the evolution of industrial
networks within qualititative frameworks either drawn from ecology-inspired
fields such as the resilience movement, or of their own devising (see [11, 43]
for example). In the meantime, theoretical ecology has made great strides
forward. However, the connection between insights from ecology and indus-
trial ecology has failed to progress apace [12]. (Although static comparisons
have been performed between the connectance of industrial networks and
food webs as a first step in reinstigating this link [44].) We believe that
this connection could still yield something useful by testing some of the
basic tenets of industrial ecology against new knowledge and potentially in-
forming practical action. Recent work on the combined effect of network
structure and inter-species interaction types on whole network properties is
a case in point.
Recent results have shown that there are substantial differences between
the resilience and persistence of networks of mutualists and trophic networks
depending on the network structure. In [45] The´bault and Fontaine stud-
ied two types of species interaction dynamics: mutualistic (pollinator-plant)
and trophic (predator-prey) on various model and empirically observed net-
works. They found that “Higher diversity and connectance promote the per-
sistence and resilience of mutualistic networks, but they destabilize trophic
networks. For mutualistic networks, modularity decreases the persistence of
the network, and nestedness increases its resilience. In contrast, for trophic
networks, nestedness decreases the persistence of the network, and modular-
ity enhances its resilience” [45, p. 855]. The practice of industrial symbiosis
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has been supported by legislation in the UK with initiatives such as the
National Industrial Symbiosis Programme [46]. Whilst the reductions in
material sent to landfill and carbon dioxide emissions are of course enor-
mously beneficial in their own right, the non-additive effects of changing
the distributions of interaction types within industrial ecosystems may have
unexpected effects. Mutualisms embedded within regional trade networks
are commonly assumed to enhance desirable whole-network properties such
as resilience and persistence. However The´bault and Fontaine have demon-
strated that, in ecological networks at least, this picture may be more nu-
anced. Network structure as well as interaction type matters in ecosystems.
It seems likely that the effect of encouraging mutualisms within industrial
ecosystems will also vary according to the structure of the industrial network
in which such policy is applied. Taking an ecological modelling approach as
our inspiration, we propose to investigate the differences in dynamics caused
by mutualistic and competitive relationships within industrial ecosystems.
However, rather than focussing on network properties such as modularity,
connectance and nestedness which have been studied in ecosystems, we will
use the network structures of different industrial district types as the context
within which to explore these effects.
Much research has been carried out on food webs and how to model
them in a quantitative, whole system, manner. The archetype of whole
system ecology models is the Lotka-Volterra model for predator-prey inter-
actions, originally developed by Lotka in the 1920s [47]. This is a dynamical
population-based model with the change in population of each individual
species being represented by a differential equation. Each equation contains
terms relating to population growth, for instance birth rates, which could
be related to the availability of food, and hence to the population of any
prey species. Each equation also contains a term representing the decrease
in population due to death. This term may be dependent on the size of
predator populations. The way that the growth and decay terms depend on
the population sizes of other species couples all of the equations together,
creating a simple model of the complete food web. Variants of this basic
Lotka-Volterra model have been applied to model many different food webs
[48, 49]. Inspired by The´bault and Fontaine’s use of a Lotka-Volterra model
to describe the dynamics on the mutualistic and trophic networks that they
studied [45], we use a similar type of model to describe the interaction be-
tween firms or industries in an industrial district, in order to explore the
relationship between industrial network structure and the effects of mutu-
alism and competition in a similar framework. Instead of each equation
modelling the size of a population of a particular species we instead create
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an equation for the ‘size’ of each firm or industry, where ‘size’ can be thought
of as an abstract concept that in some way represents the health and wealth
of a firm. (Such a measure has previously been used to identify the presence
of mutualism or competition between firms in a single sector [50].) The cou-
pling of these equations is then via the ‘size’ of supplier and customer firms
rather than prey and predator populations. This dynamical model of the
interactions of industries in a economic or geographic district will be quite
high level and general without going into many of the specifics considered
when modelling individual supply chains. The idea behind the model is
not to give intricate detail about the system but rather represent it with a
‘broad brush’ in order to make statements on the scale of the whole system,
and how it might respond to changes.
As well as trade relationships there are also what we might call social
interactions, both positive and negative. For instance, joint bidding for fund-
ing, information sharing around regulation, competition for scarce, highly
skilled workers, etc. For instance, the Humber region is of national and
international biodiversity and conservation importance and industries may
co-operate on issues of mutual concern regarding consequent development
legislation. Also, neighbouring communities face significant socio-economic
problems, meaning that there is likely to be a high level of competition for
highly skilled workers. We extend our model to incorporate such non-trade
interactions, in particular focussing on dyadic relationships (although other
relations can be approximated as a collection of dyadic relationships).
As has already been mentioned there is a plethora of different forms of
non-trade interactions, far too many to model coherently. Instead we split
the interactions down into two dichotomal types and model each of these
types from an archetypal example. The two types of interactions that we
consider are those which produce a benefit to both parties in the relationship,
so called mutualistic relationships, and those which are detrimental to the
two parties, so called competitive relationships. There are several different
forms of (non-trade) mutualistic and competitive relationships. Examples
of mutualistic relationships include information/knowledge sharing, client
referral, joint training, joint infrastructure for CHP (combined heat and
power), and joint bidding for external funding. Correspondingly, examples
of competitive interactions (excluding those due solely to trade) may include
the situation where there is competition for scarce highly skilled workers.
Another example may be reciprocated animosity between the chief execu-
tives of two firms, leading to decisions which may not be in the best interest
of the firm but would ‘hurt’ the other firm (for instance, buying patents that
they have no use for, simply to stop the other firm producing a product).
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In general there may be several non-trade interactions of each type forming
two different networks.
As a result of including these mutualistic and competitive relationships
the model now consists of dynamics on three interrelated networks. That
is, the model will span and link three different networks of the industries in
a district: the trade network, the mutualistic (non-trade) network, and the
competitive (non-trade) network. This makes it hard to isolate the effects
of mutualism and competition on the dynamics of the system as a whole.
To investigate the effects of competition and mutualism we therefore look
at subclasses of the networks. For instance before investigating an arbitrary
mutualistic network it makes sense to investigate the impact of a single
mutualistic link in an arbitrary position. Whilst we can use this approach
for the mutualistic and competitive networks we still need to constrain the
trade network in some manner. We do this by considering two distinct types
of industrial district, Marshallian districts, and hub-and-spoke districts [2].
A Marshallian district is “comprised of small, locally owned firms that
make investments and production decisions locally...within the district, sub-
stantial trade is transacted between buyers and sellers” [2, p. 297]. A typical
example of such a district is that of Italian artisan shoe makers. In general
supplies come from outside the locale and the end product is also sold out-
side the district. Within the district many of the artisan producers have the
same suppliers and customers. In terms of a network, Marshallian districts
are highly connected feed-forward networks, see the left panel of Figure 1.
The architecture of a hub-and-spoke district is quite different, right panel of
Figure 1. As the name implies, it consists of one central firm (maybe part of
a global conglomerate) with lots of local suppliers and customers, as well as
suppliers and customers that are not part of the local district. Some of these
suppliers may have suppliers of their own within the district, and some of
the customers, customers of their own. In this paper however, we shall use
the terminology ‘hub-and-spoke district’ to refer solely to the case where the
customers of the hub have no customers themselves in the network. From
a network perspective this network is again a feed-forward network. The
hub is itself both a primary supplier and an end consumer and so there is
no overlap between the definitions of the Marshallian and hub-and-spoke
districts. The Marshallian and hub-and-spoke networks are archetypes that
capture distinctive characteristics of particular types of trade networks [2].
However, real trade networks, such as that in the Humber region, will typ-
ically be more complicated than a single archetype - perhaps combining
aspects of several - and may have more complex connectivity, for example
incorporating loops.
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Figure 1: Marshallian, and hub-and-spoke districts, following Figure 1 of [2].
In this paper we investigate the effect of mutualistic and competitive
connections on the dynamics of Marshallian and hub-and-spoke districts.
Drawing inspiration here from the ecology literature where it has been seen
that the structure of the ecological web influences which types of dynamics
are stable, we expect that the effects of mutualism and competition will be
different on these two different types of industrial district.
2. A Dynamical Model of Trade Relationships
An industrial economy is made up of numerous different firms or industry
types interacting in various ways, in a spatially confined region. As an initial
attempt to model the dynamics of such a district of industrial types we shall
only consider trade interactions, consisting of the trade in goods and services.
Further, we shall make the model as simple as possible so that modifications
to include social interactions may be made and the model remain amenable
to analysis. This means, among other things that the model shall concern
only one good (locally), or equivalently make the assumption that all goods
(sold within the district) are interchangeable. This assumption is obviously
a great simplification of the reality, but leads to a reasonably simple first
model and allows us to find the data needed to initialise the model. It would
be possible to make the model more complicated; however there is a trade-off
with its usability. The aim of the model is to express the general behaviour
of the system as a whole, as simply as possible, and in that context the level
of assumptions made is appropriate.
As no spatially confined industrial economy (an industrial district) is
closed there will always be flows of materials and services into and out
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of the district. Similarly unless we model on the scale of the individual
there will be transactions between entities in the model and those which
have not been modelled, for instance individual consumers. To account for
this edge of the district we split the industry types into three categories
signifying their relationship with what lies beyond the district. They are
denoted ‘primary suppliers’ (S), ‘intermediaries’ (I) and ‘end consumers’
(C). The distinction relates to the structural role of each firm, both the
‘primary suppliers’ and the ‘end consumers’ have some form of trade link
with entities beyond those modelled in the local district. The rest of the
firms are denoted ‘intermediaries’. The ‘primary suppliers’ are those firms
who derive product from somewhere outside of the network. For instance,
if a local network is considered then any firm which buys material from
further afield is denoted a ‘primary supplier’. Additionally a firm which
mines for or otherwise produces resources (as long as the resource itself is
not modelled) is a ‘primary supplier’. ‘End consumers’ are those firms who
sell product beyond the network. This can either be thought of as global
trade when considering a local network or as selling of product to individual
customers (people or small firms not included in the model). It is important
to recognise that a ‘primary supplier’ may also buy from other firms in the
network. Similarly ‘end consumers’ may supply other nodes in the network.
It is also possible for a firm (or industry) to be both a ‘primary supplier’
and an ‘end consumer’, in this case the firm is called a hub of the network.
Figure 2 shows an example of a local trade network with labels denoting the
type of each node. Note that every node must be connected (backward) to at
least one supplier and connected (forward) to at least one consumer. A node
with no outgoing connections to other nodes in the network is automatically
an ‘end consumer’, and one with no incoming connections from other nodes
in the network is automatically a ‘primary supplier’.
With this distinction we can start formulating our model for the interac-
tions of industries in a region. We shall start by considering the industries
denoted ‘intermediary’; the equations for industries of the other two classes
can be easily derived from them. Each intermediary (by definition) will have
suppliers and customers amongst the other firms (industries) that make up
the model. For a specific firm denoted ‘firm i’ the set of firms which sup-
ply products or services to it is denoted Si, and the set of firms which buy
products or services from firm i is denoted Ci. At its most basic our model
says that each year a firm or industry grows by the amount it sells its prod-
ucts and services for, less the amount it spent buying the raw materials or
services it needed, less overhead costs. However actually writing this basic
model down proves to be fairly complicated.
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Figure 2: An example network with nodes marked as S: ‘primary supplier’, I: ’intermedi-
ary’, C: ‘end consumer’.
We denote the wealth/health/general utility of firm i by ui, and the
worth of the products or services sold to firm j by firm i by G(ui, uj). The
worth of a product (or service) will be different to those selling it and those
buying it. We model the cost to a firm i’s utility of buying from firm j as
G(uj , ui) and the gain to firm i’s utility of selling to firm j as (1+ǫi)G(ui, uj),
where ǫi is the percentage profit that firm i makes. Finally, if we denote the
percentage overhead costs of firm i by di then the basis of our model can be
written:
u˙i = (1 + ǫi)
∑
j∈Ci
G(ui, uj)−
∑
j∈Si
G(uj , ui)− diui. (1)
This equation forms the basis of our model, and is almost complete for
intermediary firms. The one major component still to add is the effect on the
utility if a firm is not able to buy all of the materials or services it requires.
This could affect the amount of its own product a firm is able to sell, however
this soon gets very complicated and would require the use of delay equations.
Instead we assume that the same amount of product (or service) is made but
it costs more or is of lower quality. For instance, buying in the completed
product from some external supplier at market rates to ensure the firm has
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enough product to sell in the short term. This would not change the worth
of the product to the customer, but would certainly affect the worth to the
supplier. We model this by imposing a multiplicative penalty term Pi on the
gain in utility given by the selling of product. This penalty is modelled as
the ratio of the actual supply of material and services to the total required
supply. Thus our model for the health/wealth of a firm becomes
u˙i = (1 + ǫi)
∑
j∈Ci
G(ui, uj)Pi −
∑
j∈Si
G(uj , ui)− diui. (2)
The details required to make (2) a complete model are expressions for
the value of product sold between firms, G(ui, uj), and the multiplicative
penalty term, Pi. There are different ways to do this, including full market
modelling in the case of the amount of product sold between firms. However
we shall again choose a simpler option. We shall assume that there is a fixed
percentage of the utility that a firm requires in supplies, βi. That is βiui
is the total amount that firm i must ‘pay’ to buy all of the materials and
services it needs when it has grown to size ui. Similarly we assume that the
value of the product each firm creates is proportional to its size ui. That is
a firm with utility ui produces products with a value ρiui. A complete list
of all the notation used in our model is given in Table 1. With this notation
we can express the penalty term (still for intermediary firms) as
Pi =
∑
j∈Si
G(uj , ui)
βiui
,
the fraction of the required supply that a firm actually managed to procure.
The expression we use for G(uj , ui) is more complicated as firm i is likely to
have multiple suppliers and each of them is likely to have multiple customers.
If each firm that supplies firm i can meet all demands for product placed
upon them by all of their customers (i.e if they’re big enough) then firm i is
able to buy the total amount of product it requires, βiui. We assume that
the amount it buys from each of its suppliers is proportional to their size
(utility). This expresses the desire to keep the largest of a firm’s suppliers
as happy as possible without totally alienating any of the other suppliers.
That is, if all of a firm’s suppliers are able to fulfil the entire demand for
product placed upon them, we have
G(uj , ui) = βiui
uj∑
k∈Si
uk
.
If on the other hand one of firm i’s suppliers (firm j say) is unable to
fulfil the total demand placed upon it then it will supply the maximum total
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amount that it can: ρjuj . It will distribute this according to the demand
placed on it by each of its customers. We again assume that it sells in
proportion to the amount each customer requires (see above), in order to
retain the largest customers without alienating any of the smaller customers.
(Note in our model we do not allow the customers or suppliers of firms to
change, although they can go out of business.) That gives
G(uj , ui) = ρjuj
βiui
uj∑
k∈Si
uk∑
l∈Cj
[
βlul
uj∑
m∈Sl
um
] .
Combining these two scenarios gives:
G(uj , ui) =


βiui
uj∑
k∈Si
uk
, if
∑
l∈Cj
[
βlul
uj∑
m∈Sl
um
]
≤ ρiui,
ρjujβiui
uj∑
k∈Si
uk
1∑
l∈Cj
[
βlul
uj∑
m∈Sl
um
] , otherwise.
(3)
This completes the details of the model for intermediary firms. We now
explain the amendments needed to cope with the ‘primary suppliers’ and
‘end consumers’. First of all note that if the current model (2) were applied
to an end consumer with no customers being modelled then there would
be no growth term, and so ui would be monotonically decreasing. Similarly
looking at a primary supplier the only negative term would be the overheads,
even though products were being bought and paid for from outside the set
of firms modelled. To counter this we add an extra term to the model
containing the utility gain or loss from exporting or importing, respectively,
materials and products from outside the set of firms modelled. We denote
this component of the model Λi, and its value depends on the classification
of the firm. If firm i is an intermediary firm then Λi = 0. We assume that
the supply of a product from outside the district is essentially unlimited.
That is, a firm which is a supplier can buy all of what it requires, βiui,
from outside the district. If a firm buys all of its supplies from outside the
district then using the total value βiui makes sense. However if it buys some
of its supplies from inside the district it would end up buying supplies to the
value of 2βiui. If this is the case we make the value of βi half what it would
otherwise be. Whilst the choice of a half of the product being bought from
within the district and half from outside of the firms modelled is arbitrary,
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it is something which could easily be improved upon in later iterations of
the model if such detailed data is available.
When considering ‘end consumers’ we make the assumption that the
external market for the products and services being created is bounded: the
total maximum demand of the external market is for products with value
M . If the total amount the district is trying to sell to the external market
exceeds the market demand then each end consumer sells according to their
size.
Thus the amount ‘end consumer’ i sells to the external market is
G˜(ui) =
{
ρiui ,M >
∑
j∈C ρjuj ,
M ui∑
j∈C uj
, otherwise.
Again if a firm is an ‘end consumer’ but also sells to other firms in the
district then we make ρi half of what it would otherwise be. If firm i is an
‘end consumer’ its utility needs to increase by (1+ǫi)G˜(ui). That is we have
Λi =


−βiui , i a primary supplier,
0 , i an intermediary,
(1 + ǫi)G˜(ui) , i an end consumer,
−βiui + (1 + ǫi)G˜(ui) , i a primary supplier and an end consumer.
Finally we must deal with the multiplicative penalty term due to lack
of supply for ‘primary suppliers’ and ‘end consumers’. As it is assumed
that there is no limit to the amount ‘primary suppliers’ (including hubs)
can procure from outside the district, no penalty due to lack of supply will
be imposed. In the case of an ‘end consumer’ (but not a hub) the penalty
term will be the same as for the intermediary firms. However the penalty
is applied to the Λi term as this is now the term which incorporates the
benefits to the utility from selling products or services. That is
Pi =
{
1 , i a primary supplier,∑
j∈Si
G(uj ,ui)
βiui
, otherwise.
Thus our model for the trade interactions of firms or industries within a
local district is
u˙i = (1 + ǫi)
∑
j∈Ci
G(ui, uj)Pi −
∑
j∈Si
G(uj , ui) + ΛiPi − diui. (4)
The notation is summarised in Table 1.
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Symbol Definition
Λa The intrinsic growth rate (seen from a local perspective) of firm a.
Pi The penalty to firm i of not buying enough product.
G(a, b) The worth of product a that is bought by firm b.
βa The value of the material or services that a needs as a proportion of its wealth.
ρa The value of a’s product or service as a proportion of its wealth.
ǫa The percentage profit made by firm a.
da Percentage upkeep costs of firm a.
Mk The maximum value of product type k which the district can sell externally.
Table 1: List of Notation
We would like to investigate the dynamics of this model, and to do that
we must parameterise the system. Due to the large number of parameters
and variations in the structure of trade networks it is impossible to look at
them all in the detail necessary for a complete analysis. In order to proceed,
therefore, we must restrict the cases to be investigated. The first restriction
that we shall make is to set the parameters for all of the different firms to
the same values. This leaves six parameters including the initial value of
the utilities. To find representative values for these parameters we take the
average values over a wide variety of industry types. Specifically we take
the average of the values derived from empirical data in [51] for a trade
network in the Humber region. This gives values of β = 0.0786, ρ = 0.3732,
ǫ = 0.3680 and d = 0.0560. We rescale the value ofM derived in [51] to allow
us to take u0 = 1 as the initial condition and to take into account the number
of end consumers in a district. That is, we divide the value found in [51] by
the number of consumers in that district (10) and then by the average utility
of all firms to give M = 1377.7422/717.0284×number of end consumers =
1.9215× number of end consumers.
Typical dynamics for the system show initial growth of the utility of
firms, followed by decline for some firms and stabilisation for others. Fig-
ures 3 and 4 show the dynamics for the Marshallian and hub-and-spoke
networks in Figure 1, for identical initial conditions for all firms and for a
set of nearby uniformly distributed random initial conditions. Note that
although the outcomes from the identical and randomised initial conditions
look different, with the firm utility trajectories being spread out in the ran-
domised case, as opposed to groups of trajectories being superimposed in
the case of identical initial conditions, exactly the same firms survive in each
case for both networks, suggesting that the dynamics are in fact fairly robust
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to small changes.
2.1. Incorporating Non-Trade Interactions
To incorporate non-trade relationships in our model (4) we simply add
the effect of the relationship to the change in health/wealth. As mentioned in
the introduction, we consider two types of interaction, mutualism and com-
petition, and their associated networks. We model the behaviour of these
two types of non-trade interaction using an archetypal example. For mutu-
alistic relationships we use information/knowledge sharing, and for compet-
itive relationships we use competition for scarce highly skilled workers.
An information/knowledge sharing initiative may consist of members
from each firm meeting up monthly to discuss ideas. In such a scenario the
cost to each firm is roughly the same and is independent of the health/wealth
(size) of the firm. On the other hand it may be thought that the benefit
to each firm is proportional to the total amount of knowledge that there
is to be shared, which in turn is roughly proportional to the joint size of
the firms participating. As we are modelling all interactions as dyadic we
must be aware of the discrepancies that this approach gives rise to. More
complicated relationships such as a three-firm joint enterprise can be roughly
modelled via a complete graph of dyadic relations, however the cost/benefit
profile will be slightly wrong. For instance if cost is independent of a firm’s
size then the dyadic relationships impose that the company pays twice as
much as it should (although this will be true for all of the firms in this
partnership). Similarly if benefit is proportional to the combined size then,
using dyadic relationships, the size of the firms is taken into account more
than once, and the benefit to all firms is also doubled. In this paper we
shall ignore this issue and only deal with this simpler form of non-trade
interaction. For a dyadic mutualistic relationship between two firms (a and
b) the cost is independent of size whilst the benefit is proportional to the
combined size (ua+ub). Thus we model the mutualistic relationship (in the
absence of any trade relationship) with the following system of equations.
u˙a = Fa(ua, ub) ≡ −C
b
a +B
b
a(ua + ub)
u˙b = Fb(ua, ub) ≡ −C
a
b +B
a
b (ua + ub), (5)
where Cji > 0 is the fixed cost of mutualism with firm j for firm i and B
j
i > 0
is the unit benefit to firm i from mutualism with firm j. In the absence of
any other connections this relationship would lead to an exponential increase
in the utility of the two firms involved in the mutualistic relationship. If
other relationships (trade or competitive) are present then the dynamics
15
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Figure 3: Trade dynamics on the Marshallian network shown in Figure 1 for (a) identical
initial conditions ui(0) = 1 for all firms and (b) initial conditions uniformly distributed
about 1: ui(0) ∼ U(0.5, 1.5). Parameter values are described in the text.
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Figure 4: Trade dynamics on the hub-and-spoke network shown in Figure 1 for (a) identical
initial conditions ui(0) = 1 for all firms and (b) initial conditions uniformly distributed
about 1: ui(0) ∼ U(0.5, 1.5). Parameter values are described in the text.
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is likely to be more complex. In such cases, to avoid the possibility of a
mutualistic relationship turning into a parasitic one (one firm benefiting
from the relationship at the expense of the other firm) we set Fa = Fb = 0
if FaFb = 0. That is if firm ‘a’ starts losing out from the presence of the
relationship with firm ‘b’, because their combined size become too small so
that Fa < 0, then firm ‘a’ would stop the relationship meaning that Fa = 0
and Fb = 0. The transition from the relationship providing a benefit to
imposing a cost occurs when either Fa = 0 or Fb = 0, i.e. when ua + ub =
Cba/B
b
a or ua + ub = C
a
b /B
a
b .
To model the competitive relationships we say that the firms involved
receive no benefit from the relationship, and that the cost is proportional to
the size (health/wealth) of the competitor firm. So if we consider two firms,
a and b purely in competition with each other then
u˙a = −c
b
aub
u˙b = −c
a
bua, (6)
where cji > 0 is the unit cost to firm i of competition with firm j . Like
mutualism we only consider competition when both firms have non-negative
values of u. In the absence of other interactions this means that both firms
will shrink. As they shrink one value of ui will eventually reach zero, and
when this happens we set u˙a = 0 = u˙b. Essentially, in the presence of
competition only, one firm dies out whilst the other survives at its expense.
Incorporating the dynamics for mutualistic and competitive relation-
ships, the extended model including trade and non-trade interactions is
formed of three networks: a directed one of the trade interactions, an undi-
rected mutualistic network, and an undirected competition network; and the
following dynamics:
u˙i = (1+ǫi)
∑
j∈Ci
G(ui, uj)Pi−
∑
j∈Si
G(uj , ui)+ΛiPi−diui+
∑
j∈Mui
[Bji (ui+uj)−C
j
i ]−
∑
j∈Coi
cjiuj ,
(7)
where Mui is the set of firms in a mutualistic relationship with firm i, and
Coi is the set of firms in a competitive relationship with firm i.
In the remainder of this paper we use this model to investigate the effect
non-trade interactions have on the dynamics of various types of industrial
district. In order to do this we consider simple cases comprising a trade
network and either a competitive interaction or a mutualistic interaction.
Investigating more complicated mutualistic and competitive networks can-
not easily be performed in a systematic manner. Instead we consider the
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results found from the simplest cases to suggest what the effects of more
complicated interactions might be.
3. The Effects of Mutualism and Competition
As mentioned in the introduction we shall use two types of industrial
district to investigate the effect of mutualism and competition on the dy-
namics: a Marshallian district, and a hub-and-spoke district (Figure 1). We
study the simplest form of non-trade network, that is a single mutualistic
or competitive relationship between two firms. We shall also study whether
the positioning of this relationship has an impact on the dynamics. To do
this we look at several different structural classes for the position of the
non-trade relationship relative to the underlying trade network. This will
allow us to make suggestions that may be relevant to real life Marshallian
or hub-and-spoke districts.
To define some of the positions for a non-trade connection we use the
classification of the firms as primary suppliers, intermediaries, or end con-
sumers. The positions that we shall use in our analysis are as follows:
• Along a pre-existing trade link.
• Not along a pre-existing trade link. That is, there is no trade con-
nection between the two firms that are in the mutualistic/competitive
relationship.
• Between two primary suppliers.
• Between two intermediaries.
• Between two end consumers.
• Between a primary supplier and an intermediary.
• Between a primary supplier and an end consumer.
• Between an intermediary and an end consumer.
These positions are not mutually exclusive: for example a link can be pre-
existing and also connect a supplier and an intermediary.
To deal with the differences in structure of the trade network that are
possible we shall make a restriction to look only at networks with a set
number of nodes. For our analysis we shall restrict to studying the effect
of mutualism and competition on networks that have 12 nodes. This gives
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a fairly small network on which the model dynamics run in a computa-
tionally accessible time and provides us a reasonably simple framework in
which to analyse the effect of competitive and mutualistic interactions. For
Marshallian districts we also specify a set number of edges, 20, so that the
network is not sparsely connected, and may for certain parameter values
have all possible connections present. We choose to fix these choices, leav-
ing aside for now the question of sensitivity to the choices themselves, in
order to maintain focus on our main topic of investigation, namely mutual-
ism and competition. Of course there are many possible sensitivity analyses
that could be performed. However the general form of the trade dynamics
- growth of utility followed by decline for some firms and stabilisation for
others - appears to be quite consistent and we do not expect to see regime
changes or bifurcations in the dynamics.
We still have the freedom to choose how many of the nodes are primary
suppliers and how many are end consumers (and implicitly, how many are
intermediaries). Depending on this choice the Marshallian networks will
range from having all of the connections possible to having about half of the
connections possible. In the case of one supplier and one consumer, there
are only 20 possible connections to choose from, and so all connections will
be present. On the other hand if there are, for example, three suppliers
and three consumers then there are 36 possible connections to choose from,
and so only just over half are present. For a hub-and-spoke district (with
a single hub) specifying the number of primary suppliers, end consumers
and nodes automatically specifies the number of edges. We shall treat the
number of primary suppliers, ns, and the number of end consumers, nc, as
parameters to be varied in our simulations. As we have fixed the number
of nodes (and edges in the Marshallian case) the possible values of these
parameters form a fairly small closed set, and so we shall run our dynamical
model on a random ensemble of 100 instances of each district type for each
possible combination of ns and nc.
We use the same parameter values for the trade dynamics as in the pre-
vious section. The only remaining freedom is the choice of the parameters
associated with the mutualistic network, Cji and B
j
i , and with the competi-
tion network, cji . Due to the difficulties arising from the number of possible
network structures, mentioned previously, we only look at the addition of a
single mutualistic or competitive link. As such we do not expect that mak-
ing the further restriction Cji = C, B
j
i = B and c
j
i = c for all i and j will
significantly affect the applicability of our results. Specifically, for mutual-
istic interactions we set C = 0.002 and B = 0.004. That is, the benefit per
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unit joint wealth from mutualism is twice the cost. Later we shall explore
(in one case only) what effect this choice for B and C has on the district.
Similarly we set c = 0.001, and later also explore what effect this choice of
parameter gives. Due to the number of model parameters such an analysis
will by necessity not be rigorous and can only give suggestions as to the
behaviour of the system in general.
To summarise, we shall run simulations for various values of ns and nc,
for each of the district types, and for various positions of the mutualistic or
competitive connection. It would be very hard to find representative tran-
sient dynamics for all of these individual scenarios, and so we shall focus
on the long term behaviour. From running the model on several different
networks it seems that the district commonly transitions to a fixed point.
That is, each firm has a constant utility in the long run. As this seems to
be a common behaviour we shall use it to investigate the effect of the struc-
tural position of mutualism and competition. For each simulation, we store
details on whether a fixed point is reached (before a specific cut-off time)
so that we can check that the assumption of transition to a fixed point is
indeed a valid one. The cut-off time is chosen so as to capture the final equi-
librium, and retrospectively we check that there are no further effects on a
longer timescale by running the simulation for three times this long. We also
store details of what proportion of firms survive (have nonzero utility) at
equilibrium and what the average utility of the surviving firms is. From this
data we can work out the percentage change in how many firms survived at
equilibrium and their average value when mutualism/competition is intro-
duced compared to the baseline case without mutualism/competition, for
each type of mutualisitic or competitive link position and each value of ns
and nc. These values are then aggregated to calculate the average (median)
and spread of change for each position type (over variations in the number
of suppliers and consumers). This data is presented using box and whisker
diagrams, where the whiskers depict the range of the data.
3.1. Marshallian District
The effect of various positions of a competitive connection on the per-
formance of a Marshallian district is shown in Figure 5. These results do
not include the simulations where a long term equilibrium was not reached,
which accounted for about 0.03% of the simulations run on Marshallian dis-
tricts. For comparison, when a second ensemble of simulations that don’t
include mutualism or comparison was run, the median of percentage change
in the proportion of firms surviving was zero, while the interquartile and full
ranges were [-1.05%,1.05%] and [-5.63%,4.48%] respectively. The median of
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percentage change in the average value of surviving firms was zero, with
interquartile and full ranges of [-1.21%,0.99%] and [-4.23%,6.66%].
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Figure 5: The effect on the long-term behaviour of the dynamics of industries in a Mar-
shallian district of the addition of a competitive connection in various structural positions.
The first thing to notice is the similarity between all of the scenarios for
the positioning of a competitive connection. The average effect is always to
decrease the mean proportion of firms that survive and increase the mean
wealth of surviving firms. Note that because we show the distribution over
values of ns and nc of the means over an ensemble of 100 realisations for
each combination of these values, we cannot deduce that mean wealth goes
up when firm numbers go down. However, this is a likely scenario and does
make sense: if two firms are in competition then if one of them thrives this
has a detrimental effect on the other, meaning that there is an increased
chance of that firm going bust. As the system as a whole is only constrained
by the total external market demand,M , this could have the effect of driving
up the average value of all the other firms.
However, apart from this similarity the most interesting things we can see
from this figure are differences. For instance, there is a noticeable difference
in the scale of the effect of a competitive relationship between firms in the
same ‘layer’ and those in different ‘layers’. For instance the percentage
decrease in the number of firms surviving is smaller for supplier-supplier,
and intermediary-intermediary competitive relationships than for supplier-
consumer, and intermediary-consumer competitive relationships. This fact
is probably the main reason that competition along pre-existing trade links
has a more pronounced effect than competition that does not coincide with
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a trade link. Interactions along pre-existing trade links will be between
different ‘layers’ whilst interactions which are not along a pre-existing trade
link will be split between those within a ‘layer’ and those between ‘layers’.
Another result to draw out is the danger (in terms of the number of
firms surviving) in having a competitive relationship which involves an end
consumer. Either as a supplier or intermediary it seems that the most pro-
nounced effect comes from having a competitive connection with a consumer.
This is probably due to the fact that the ‘end consumer’ is slightly worse
off in terms of the external marketplace, meaning that the other ‘end con-
sumers’ (and their suppliers) are likely to do better at the expense of the
consumer (and its suppliers) in the competitive relationship. Thus the most
pronounced effect in shaping the district is caused by competitive relation-
ships along pre-existing trade links, between different‘layers’ of the network,
and involving an end consumer.
We now move on to consider the effect of mutualistic relationships on
the district. The results from our simulations are shown in Figure 6. As
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Figure 6: The effect on the long-term behaviour of the dynamics of industries in a Mar-
shallian district of the addition of a mutualistic connection in various structural positions.
in the case of competition we again comment on the broad similarities first.
For mutualistic connections it appears that these similarities are not as
pronounced as for the competitive interactions. In fact the only similar-
ity appears to be that the average value of the surviving firms is likely to
increase, independent of the position of the mutualistic relationship.
The differences however are more pronounced and interesting. First of
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all the effect of a mutualistic relationship between two suppliers or two
intermediaries seems to be special in that in most cases either the mean
number of firms that the district can sustain or the average value of surviving
firms or both increase, which could be viewed as a tendency to lead to a more
‘egalitarian’ district. This is the best possible scenario when considering the
district as a whole.
On the other hand any mutualistic relationship involving an end con-
sumer (almost) always causes a much larger rise in the wealth of the firms
surviving in the district, however this is at the cost of the number of surviv-
ing firms decreasing. This makes sense, if an end consumer is in a mutualistic
relationship then it has an advantage over the other end consumers in terms
of the external market. As it is the capacity of the external market that
constrains the district this leads to this end consumer, its suppliers, and its
mutualistic partner performing better to the detriment of all other firms.
Thus, we have two distinct scenarios. For an egalitarian district, with
capacity for more firms to survive and/or perform better, mutualistic re-
lationships should be encouraged between primary suppliers, and between
intermediaries. However from an individual (primary supplier or interme-
diary) firm’s perspective the pay off in terms of wealth would probably be
much greater if a mutualistic relationship were formed along a pre-existing
link, between layers, and ideally with an end consumer. End consumers
themselves should try to form mutualistic relationships with firms which
directly supply them or with primary suppliers.
We can also compare the relative effect of mutualism and competition.
Looking at Figures 5 and 6 together we can immediately observe that the ef-
fect of a mutualistic relationship is much more pronounced than the effect of
a competitive relationship. This is particularly interesting when considering
the average decrease in the percentage of firms surviving in the long term.
Perhaps surprisingly, a mutualistic connection (on average) has a worse im-
pact on the number of firms that the district supports in the long term than
a competitive connection.
3.2. Hub-and-Spoke District
Moving on to hub-and-spoke trade networks (where all end consumers
are supplied directly and only by the hub), we study the effect of the place-
ment of a single competitive or mutualistic connection. For consistency with
the analysis for Marshallian districts, when placing the mutualistic or com-
petitive connection we count the hub as both a supplier and a consumer.
So, for instance, a supplier-supplier connection may in fact be between a
supplier and the hub.
24
For comparison, when a second ensemble of simulations that don’t in-
clude mutualism or competition was run, the median and full range of per-
centage change in the proportion of firms surviving was exactly zero and
the median of percentage change in the average value of surviving firms was
also zero, while the full range was [-0.43%,0.54%].
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Figure 7: The effect on the long-term behaviour of the dynamics of industries in a hub-and-
spoke district of the addition of a competitive connection in various structural positions.
The output from running simulations of the model with a single com-
petitive link is shown in Figure 7. Note that all simulations run gave the
long-term behaviour of a hub-and-spoke district as an equilibrium. The
only major similarity that we see across all placement types is that the av-
erage number of firms surviving always decreases. With the exception of an
intermediary-intermediary competitive connection this decrease in the mean
number of firms surviving in the long term coincides with an increase in the
average value of surviving firms. Again a resonable interpretation is that
this is due to the district being constrained by the demand of the external
market. The exception of the intermediary-intermediary interaction is very
interesting. Here the typical change in the mean value of surviving firms is
very slightly negative. Whilst in a substantial proportion of simulations the
average value of surviving firms increases, over half of the time the average
value decreased. This could be due to the fact that such competition is
likely to reduce the flow of materials to the hub from two of its sources as
well as the primary suppliers which supply them, creating a situation where
the expansion of the hub is restricted.
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Another aspect of the output to highlight is the difference in mag-
nitude between the effect of a competitive relationship between firms in
the same ‘layer’ (e.g. supplier-supplier) and those in different ‘layers’ (e.g.
intermediary-consumer). The effect, particularly in the decrease in the num-
ber of firms surviving in the long term, is much more pronounced for con-
nections between firms in different ‘layers’ and for competition along pre-
existing trade links. The position of the median is closest for the increase in
value for supplier-supplier and supplier-intermediary links, but the supplier-
intermediary link still gives a greater increase. This is likely to be due to
a feedback effect, where a profitable firm ends up driving down the wealth
of one of its (possibly indirect) suppliers and hence restricts its own supply
in some way. This effect appears to be most pronounced when competition
links an intermediary and an end consumer: we suggest that this is because
such an interaction will always have a direct effect on the supply of mate-
rial to the hub, and on its ability to sell within the district. As the hub is
central to the district any impact on it will have an effect on the whole of
the network.
Finally, we consider the effect of a mutualistic link on the dynamics
of a hub-and-spoke district (Figure 8). As with the competitive link, it
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Figure 8: The effect on the long-term behaviour of the dynamics of industries in a hub-and-
spoke district of the addition of a mutualistic connection in various structural positions.
appears that the mean number of firms which survive in the long run always
decreases, and this decrease always coincides with an increase in the average
value of surviving firms. Unlike the competitive interaction there does not
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appear to be a clear dichotomy between the effect of a mutualistic connection
between firms in the same ‘layer’ and those in different layers. It appears
that the strongest effect comes from mutualism between layers where one of
the partners is an end consumer. Generally the effect of mutualism between
firms in the same layer is not as strong as those in different layers. However
this is further complicated by the fact that the effect of mutualism which is
not along a pre-existing trade connection is slightly stronger than the effect
when it is along a pre-existing trade link. We believe that this is due to
the fact that there are no trade interactions between the different supply
chains of the hub. Thus a connection which is not along a pre-existing trade
link is likely to couple two supply chains (or two customers of the hub, or
a supply chain and a customer of the hub) meaning that there is a larger
effect on the network than mutualism which just affects one chain. The only
possible caveat to this is if the mutualistic relationship is along a trade link
directly involved with the hub, in which case the direct effect on the hub
will probably have a large knock-on impact on the rest of the district.
We can also compare the relative effects of mutualism and competition.
The most prominent difference is again in the scale of the effect seen. A single
mutualistic connection has a much stronger effect than a single competitive
one. A mutualistic connection on average decreases the number of firms
surviving by about 40 percent whilst competition only produces an average
reduction of about 6 percent. This is perhaps a little surprising, as we might
intuitively expect mutualism to have a lesser effect, in terms of reducing the
number of firms that survive, than competition. However it is likely that
the model is actually showing different firms being impacted in the two
cases. For mutualism the firms that fail to survive are likely not to be
partners in the mutualistic relationship, whilst for competition the firms
in the competitive relationship are likely not to survive. This is due to
mutualism broadly giving a firm an advantage relative to the rest of the
district whilst competition broadly gives the firm a disadvantage.
3.3. Comparison
Having looked at the effects of mutualism and competition on Marshal-
lian districts and hub-and-spoke districts separately we now compare the
two, to emphasise the similarities and the differences. The most striking
similarity is that in both district types mutualism had a much stronger effect
than competition. This points to the importance of mutualistic relationships
in shaping industrial districts. However, we stress that more complicated
patterns of mutualistic and competitive relationships are likely to be subtler
in their effects. In order to assess whether the stronger effect of mutualism
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could be an artefact of the parameters chosen for the strength of the mu-
tualistic and competitive connections we look at one case chosen at random
and vary these parameters (B, C and c). We do this for both the Marshal-
lian and hub-and-spoke districts. We choose to look at districts with two
suppliers, five intermediaries and five consumers. In the Marshallian case
we also restrict to districts with twenty edges, as described earlier. We look
at the effect on the percentage increase of firms surviving when a non-trade
connection (mutualistic or competitive) is made along a pre-existing trade
connection as the mutualism and competition parameters are varied. To
do this we create several instances of the district for each parameter choice
and then take the average. The average decrease in the percentage of firms
which survive in the long run when a non-trade connection is added along
a pre-existing trade link is shown in Figures 9 and 10 for Marshallian and
hub-and-spoke districts respectively.
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Figure 9: The effect on the percentage decrease of the average number of firms surviving
of varying the mutualism and competition parameters for Marshallian districts (with two
suppliers, five intermediaries, five consumers and twenty links) with a non-trade interaction
along a pre-existing trade connection. Left panel: the mutualism parameters (B and C)
are varied. (Colour online: the surface is coloured according to its height, red being the
highest points and blue the lowest.) Right panel: the competition parameter (c) is varied.
From Figures 9 and 10 it appears to be generically true that mutualism
has a stronger effect than competition when only a single non-trade connec-
tion is present. For the Marshallian district this is only not true when the
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Figure 10: The effect on the percentage decrease of the average number of firms surviving
of varying the mutualism and competition parameters for hub-and-spoke districts (with
two suppliers, five intermediaries and five consumers) with a non-trade interaction along
a pre-existing trade connection. Left panel: the mutualism parameters (B and C) are
varied. (Colour online: the surface is coloured according to its height, red being the
highest points and blue the lowest.) Right panel: the competition parameter (c) is varied.
cost of mutualism is greater than the benefit (in which case it is not truly
a mutualistic relationship). For hub-and-spoke districts it may only not be
true if the competition parameter, c, is several orders of magnitude stronger
than the mutualistic benefit parameter, B. Hence we highlight for further
investigation the hypothesis that the effects of mutualism on an industrial
district are more pronounced than those of competition.
Another similarity between the outcomes of adding a mutualistic or com-
petitive connection in the two district types is that, in most cases, a decrease
in the percentage of firms that survive occurred with a resulting increase in
the health/wealth of these surviving firms.
Looking specifically at competition in the two district types, there were
further similarities. Firstly the effect was more pronounced when the com-
petitive relationship was between different ‘layers’ rather than within the
same ‘layer’. Furthermore a competitive relationship along a pre-existing
trade link had a stronger effect than one that was not along a pre-existing
trade connection. The notable similarity between the two industrial district
types in the case of mutualism was that the most pronounced effect was
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caused by a mutualistic connection involving an ‘end consumer’.
There were also several differences between the two district types in the
effects of the non-trade relationships. For instance, in Marshallian districts
there was the opportunity for a more egalitarian industrial district to arise
from mutualism between suppliers and between intermediaries, with the
mean percentage of firms that survive in the long run and the mean individ-
ual firm wealth both being likely to increase (though typically not both at
the same time). In hub-and-spoke districts such an effect does not appear
to be possible: neither mutualism nor competition can increase the average
percentage of firms surviving in the long run.
Another difference between the district types is in the probability of
decreasing the average utility of surviving firms. In a hub-and-spoke district
a competitive relationship between intermediaries leads, on average, to a
slight decrease in the value of the surviving firms, something that is not seen
(on average) for any placements of competitive or mutualistic relationships
in Marshallian districts.
The final point we wish to highlight is that the effect of non-trade re-
lationships is typically stronger along pre-existing trade relationships. The
exception is for mutualistic relationships in a hub-and-spoke network, where
the mutualism couples disparate supply chains increasing both their chances
of survival.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we set out to begin to investigate the effect of non-trade
interactions on the performance of an industrial district. In order to do
this we introduced a model of trade dynamics and extended it to incor-
porate dyadic interactions that were divided into two classes: mutualistic
relationships that were beneficial to both parties involved, and competi-
tive relationships that were detrimental to both parties. We investigated
what impact a single non-trade relationship would have on the district as a
whole for instances of two archetypal industrial districts: Marshallian and
hub-and-spoke.
We found that, in general, both mutualistic and competitive relation-
ships caused the number of firms that survive in a district in the long run
to fall, whilst increasing the average value of the firms that did survive.
We also discovered that the effect of a single mutualistic relationship was
more pronounced than that of a single competitive relationship. In some
circumstances a mutualistic relationship could be worse (in terms of the
number of firms surviving) for the district as a whole than a competitive
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one. However, from an individual firm’s perspective it was better to be in a
mutualistic relationship than a competitive one.
We also investigated whether the position of the relationship made any
difference to the effect on the district. To do this we looked at non-trade re-
lationships between different classes of node, for instance between a primary
supplier and an intermediary. We found that the position of the relationship
did indeed make a difference to the outcome. In most instances this only
affected the magnitude of the effect: for instance, a mutualistic relationship
had the most effect if one of the partners was an end consumer, and a com-
petitive relationship had the most effect if the competitors were in different
structural classes (supplier, intermediary, consumer). However in some in-
stances the position of a non-trade relationship produced a qualitatively dif-
ferent average outcome for the district. For instance in Marshallian districts
with mutualism between suppliers or between intermediaries it was likely
that the mean number of firms surviving in the long run actually increased
and so did the mean wealth of surviving firms (although not by much, and
only occasionally in the same realisations). Building such relationships thus
provided an opportunity to make the industrial district more egalitarian.
Conversely competition between intermediaries in a hub-and-spoke district
led to the average of both the mean proportion of surviving firms and the
mean value of surviving firms falling. That is, misplaced competition in
a hub-and-spoke district could lead to lower diversity and/or lower utility
of the district. This situation did not arise for the more interconnected
Marshallian districts.
The model we have presented necessarily greatly simplifies the dynamics
that would be present in any real-world industrial district, and so our results
are only suggestive of how mutualism and competition might operate in real
trade networks. However this initial study suugests that the effect of non-
trade dynamics on industrial districts may be profound. We now intend to
revisit the case study of the Humber region [51, 1, 42] to develop a more
empirically based method for identifying and analysing the mutualistic and
competitive non-trade interactions that are fundamental in that industrial
district, in order to gain insight into what the future might hold as the
system transitions to a bio-based economy. One intriguing possibility is
that analysis may suggest mutualistic relationships that could be initiated
to speed up (or slow down) such a transition.
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